Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'De Re and De Dicto' and 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals'

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]